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ABSTRACT
Current U.S. tax law creates a variety of incentives affecting municipal
financial policy. Undercurrentlaw,municipalitiescan borrow at a tax—
exempt interest rate yet can earn the full market rate of return on any
assets held. Residents, in contrast, if they borrow or lend as individuals,
pay or earn the market rate of return but after personal income taxes. These
differences in rates of return create a variety of arbitrage opportunities,
allowing conirnunities/residents to borrow at low rates and invest at higher
rates.
The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the financial policy
of municipalities in four states (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts and Rhode
Island) to see to what degree these municipalities attempt to take advantage
of each of the available opportunities to engage in tax arbitrage. Our data
comes from the 1980 U.S. Census of Population and Housing, and the 1977 U.S.
Census of Governments. We find clear evidence that communities do actively
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Current U. S. tax law creates a variety of incentives affecting municipal
financial policy. Under current law, municipalities can borrow at a tax—exempt
interest rate yet can earn the full market rate of return on any assets held.
Residents, in contrast, iftheyborrow or lend as individuals, pay or earn the
market rate of return but after personal income taxes. These differences in
rates of return create a variety of arbitrage opportunities, allowing
contnunities/residents to borrow at low rates and invest at higher rates.
The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the financial policy of
municipalities in four states (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts and Rhode
Island) to see to what degree these municipalities attempt to take advantage of
eacn of the available opportunities to engaoe in tax arbitrage. Our data comes
frorr the 1930 U. .Censuso Population and Housinc, and the 1977 U. S. Census
cf Sovernments. e fro clear evioence triat communities dc actively encae in
suchtax arbitrage.
The oroaniza:ior of the paper is as follows.In section i, we explore in
more aeta the tax incentives affecting rnunicipa iran:iai poncy, and then
d SCLSSotieactc ncn may a'sc rfluence financia ecisions n section
we oescribe tne construction o tne cata set used intheemoir1ca stucy.
ant present tables sunrnarizing the oeneral characteristics of municipal finar—
cial nciicy.insection 11, we present and discuss the results of our-2-
regression analyses investigating the role of the various factors affecting
municipal financial policy. Finally, in section IV,wecomment briefly on the
implications of our results for the distributional and efficiency effects of the
current tax treatment of municipal financial policy.
I.Factors affecting municipal financial decisions.
A. Tax Factors
1. Base Case
Based on a simplified view of the current tax law, individuals when
investing as individuals face a nominal before—tax interest rate of r and an
after-tax rate of r(1-t),1 where t is their marginal personal income tax rate.
Assume that all residents in a community face the same marginal tax rate, that
their marginal tax rate will remain constant over time, and that any prospec-
tive home buyer in the community will have the same tax rate. (Assume also that
if they currently itemize deductions, then they and any buyers will also itemize
in the future.)
If an individuals community buys securities, the community can earn a
before and after tax return of r, while the community can borrow at a tax—exempt
interest rate, which we denote by rm. By construction let rmr(l-tm). Due to
its tax—exempt status, rm has historically beer approximately 70% of the value
Differences between
(1)thecommunity's borrowing rate, rrn,
(2) the corrLmunity's lendinc rate, r, and
(3) the residents borroinc arc lendincrate,r(-t),
createa variety of arbitrace occortunities whereby the cornunity/residents car
borrocc a low rate and lend cc a hiahe- race.Tnreedifferent formsof
arbtraaea—c possible civencrc three differer: pairwise differences in the
abovebO—rowinc arc lendinc rates.-3-
In the first and simplest form of arbitrage, comparing rates of return (1)
and (2), the community can borrow a dollar through the municipal bond market,
and invest it in taxable securities, receiving on net r—rmtmr. The IRS has
been concerned about this form of arbitrage, and in 1969 a section was added to
the Internal Revenue Code which attempted to restrict severely the extent of
such arbitrage. Specifically, section 103(c) of the Internal Revenue Code
states that interest on municipal debt is taxable if a major portion of a debt
issue is used directly or indirectly to buy securities earning a materially
higher rate of return. Proceeds from a debt issue can be invested temporarily
in taxable securities, however, and by statute up to fifteen percent can remain
invested for extended periods, as a reserve or replacement fund. The IRS has
not been very aggressive in enforcing this statute. Only in 1979 did it rule
that a conrnunity which has large holdings of taxable securities relative to its
outstanding debt is in violation of section 103(c) per Se, even if the debt were
issued for a clearly different purpose. The interpretation of the statute was
less clear in 1977, the year our data were collected. In addition, the IRS has
recently allowed corrrnunities to borrow in order to invest in taxable securities
if the purpose is to raise their bond rating. We will assume for now, however,
that the IRS does enforce the statute, so communities are permitted to invest
only n percent of any debt issue in taxable securities, and that allcomunities
purusc tnis abitraa to tne lecal limit. Eviaence or tne extent to wnich
communities engaoe inthisarbitrage is presented below.
A second form of arbitrage available to communities, comparing rates of
return (2)and(3), is to raise property taxes now, invest the proceeds in
taxable bonds, tnen use the proceeds from the bonds to lower property taxes in
tne future. By investing indirectly throuah the community, individuals earn a
rateofreturn on their investment of r, rather than the rate of return of
r-t available wren they investdireclty.When they invest an extra dollar-4-
through the community, residents gain r—r(1—t)=rt each year in arbitrage
profits.3The IRS has not attempted to restrict this second form of arbitrage.
In the third and final form of arbitrage, comparing rates of return (1) and
(3), communities/residents attempt to take advantage of the difference between
r and r(1—t). Wealthier be individuals, for whom r(l-t)<rm, will want to
borrow as individuals and buy tax—exempt securities. In this situation, their
municipality plays no role. Individuals in lower tax brackets, however, for
whom r(l-t)>rm, cannot borrow as individuals at the tax—exempt rate in order to
invest at r(i—t) —-onlymunicipalities can borrow at the tax—exempt rate. But
these individuals can have their municipality borrow for them at rate r, then
use what is borrowed to lower property taxes. The residents can then invest
what they save in property taxes and earn a rate of return of r(l-t). On net
they gain r(l—t)—rm in arbitrage profits.4 However, communities are allowed by
sta.:ute to invest a fraction of what they borrow in taxable securities. Given
this, the net gain to residents each year per dollar borrowed becomes
(l-n)(r(l-t)-rm)+n(r-rm) =r(t)-(l-n)t). (1)
For many communities, the last two forms of arbitrage (raise property taxes
and invest in bonds earning r, or lower property taxes and borrow at rate rrn)
carsirrtaneously beworthwhile. However,ifbct ae pursued the community is
in effect borrowing at r and investing at r, tne policy which is restricted by
the IRS, Each community must therefore choose to pursue either one policy or
the otner. Which is preferable? That depends first on tne relative gain per
doila change in current property taxes, and second on how aggressively one
policy versusthe other can be pursuec and what offsetting costs are incurred
whendoing so.
the corrrruritv chooses to lower taxesand oorro, wnat limits the amount-5-
of such tax arbitrage that it can undertake? One potential limit is that states
set statutory limits on how much municipalities can borrow. Generally, the
statutes specify that the outstanding debt in a municipality cannot exceed some
per cent of the assessed property value of the community.5 Commonly, separate
limits are set for school bonds and for debt of special districts, so that
creating special districts allows more debt to be issued. In addition, some
forms of debt are normally entirely exempt from these limits, and states often
provide a mechanism to relax a binding restriction on debt issues.It therefore
seems unlikely that a community would face such a binding limit.
Similarly, states often allow debt to be issued for only certain purposes,
e.g. capital expenditures and short—run cash flow needs. These restrictions set
some upper limit on debt issues, though communities should have some flexibility
in broadening the definition o 'capital expenditures when the restriciton is
binding. Aogregate data, however, suggest that this constraint is not close to
binding on average. For example, Peterson (1978) and Peterson (1981) report the
per cent ofstate and local capital expendituresfinanced by long term bonds, by
federalaid,and oy other local resources for selected years between 1952 and
1977. In these figures, long term debt issues never exceeded 56% oftotal
capital outlays, and never exceeded 65.4% ofnon-federalexpenditures on capital
outlays. (The averagefigureswere 42.7% and 55.8% resoectively.)
Urorojnate,: was no: possiole to test exoiici:iy whethe sucr aconstraint
wasclosetobiacing in any ofthetownsin our sample.6
Some othe nonstatutory factor seems to limit the extent to which com-
munities issue debt. One possible factor limitino the amount ofborrowingby a
communityisriskaversionortre partofresidents. ThereaT valueofthe
outstandingmur:icpal debtisrandom,oependinc Or:interestrate fluctuations
andiniation. incethe reia:ive interest rates on municipaloonos and taxable
bonds cranoesubstantially over time, as showr in Poterba (i9S: ,borrowing in—6-
themunicipal market and investing in the taxable market is by no means a fully
hedged investment. Risk aversion would limit the size of municipal debt rela-
tive to the individual s total wealth, everything else equal.
Alternatively, the same set of factors appealed to in discussion of cor-
porate financial policy,7 agency costs and bankruptcy costs, could also play a
role in limiting the amount of municipal debt. The only implicit security that
lenders have is the tax base of the community, so they would be increasingly
reluctant to lend as the outstanding debt grows relative to this tax base.8 In
sumary, agency costs and risk aversion each provide an explanation for why
municipal debt cannot become too large relative to the municipal property tax
base, or the total wealth, of the community.
Related factors presumably limit the extent to which residents will invest
their wealth through the community. Accounting standards in communities would
no tally be viewed as lax compared with those of mutual funds, so residents may
wellfearthat municipal employees could divert surplus funds into excess
expenditures on municipal services, orinvestitpoorly.The more money that is
invested in the community, presumably the more difficult itwouldbe to auard
acainst such behavior. In addition, the risk individuals face on such invest-
ments includes not only the risk in the return on the securities, but also the
riskin thevalue oftheirproperty relative to the totaltaxbase of the
:orruty, and the risk tnat ar ouve not aoe:ua:ei\' take into account tne
value of theasset oeincpurchased with tne house. Individuals would become
increasingly risk averse at the marginasmora oftheirwealth depends on the
value of theirhouse.
Tnc benefitsfran ourusinc onetn atner a:itreoc stratecies varywith
one ta. rate of tne resioents — one ocir: fror investincthrough the community,
'o,c—ows wtr t,whereas tne 35r rcn o:rrowinç :nrouar, toe communit,
t__i_r't). fails wtr, t.In ccnoaso. toe offsettinccostslimtn: one—7—
extent of such arbitrage should not depend directly on the tax rate of the
residents. We would therefore expect corinunities with low tax rates to favor
issuing municipal bonds, while wealthy corrinunities would prefer to invest
through their corrrnunity. These are two of the principal relationships we will
look for in the empirical analysis.
2. Complicating factors
In the above discussion, we assumed that the after-tax rate of return to
savingsfor the individual was r(1—t), and ignored the individual1s portfolio
problem. However, if individuals can exchange taxable and tax exempt bonds
freely and without constraint, they will do so until they are indifferent at the
margin to owning one or the other. For example, at this point the cost of
bearing the extra risk in the return on municipal bonds just offsets any gain in
expected return. In this situation, as residents they would be indifferent bet-
ween having the community borrow in the municipal bond market or raising taxes
(assuming n0). Wealthier individuals (those facing a t>trn) will normally be
in just this situation, investing in taxable and tax exempt securitiesUntil
indifferent.9 They would then find the riskier return on municipal bonds just
equivalent to the return r(i—t), implying that the gain from having the
community borrow an extra dollar,asexpressed in equation (I),simplifiesto
nrt.Poorer jndiyidualc. in contrast, cannot sel muricipa bonos short as
individualsanc invest tne oroceecs intaxable bonas aver exis:nc insttU-
tions.Instead, they have their community borrowfor themonthe municipal
market, just as described previously,in summary, the gain to residents from an
extra dollar of municipaldebt would nowecual max(tm-(i—ri)t,nt)r.
The above discussion also focussed onasituation where residents do not
itemzc.if residentsdoitemize, then any property tax payment costs residents
only (i—t)per cent of the tax payment. Therefore,everythnc else equal,
ienerscan hope to collect 1/(I-t)times as much from residents when residents-8-
itemize, so would view 1/(1-t) dollars of debt from a community where residents
itemize as equivalent in risk to one dollar of debt from a community of non—
itemizers. As a result, both the costs of issuing an extra dollar of debt and
the benefits of issuing an extra dollar (see footnote 3) are reduced by (1-t)
per cent when residents itemize. Communities where residents itemize should
therefore undertake the same amount of tax arbitrage as communities where resi-
dents do not itemize, everything else equal, but in doing so would issue 1/(1—t)
times as much debt.
This argument assumes that if residents itemize deductions in one year,
then they itemize in all years. If not, then individuals face an incentive to
shift tax payments towards those years in which they itemize, when the payments
are tax deductible. Most new homeowners itemize, but as time passes owners
would eventually become increasingly unlikely to itemize. Therefore, new owners
WOLd face a strong incentive to pay as much as possible in property taxes while
they itemize, so ought to avoid having their municipality borrow (and would
prefer having it build up a reserve). Similarly, during the years in which
the individual does itemize, he would prefer to push his property tax payments
towards the years in which his personal income tax rate is highest. Furthennore,
ar individual who is no longer itemizing, and who is expecting to sell his house
intne near futuretosomeonewno will beitemizinc, would much prefer to keep
cr: taxes as o as pcssioe no anc have the municipalit go into debt.
Tne vercaroccuoc the cost o repaying tnis debt, and will therefore reduce
his bid for the property by oni'v (1-t) per cent of the value of the outstanding
aeb:. Tne cain to the seller from lowering taxes is the full reduction in
taxes, since ne does not itemize. anc losinc (-t) per cent ofthegain through
the sale price o hishouseis an attractive exorance. Bythesame argument, an
irdvcul in tris situation would be reluctant to buiic up assets inthe corn——9-
B. Nontax factors
1. Lumpiness of capital expenditures.
Conventional wisdom says that lumpy expenditure are more likely to be
financed with debt, because it is difficult to adjust property tax rates enough
to cover extraordinary capital expenditures. However, this factor does not
necessarily imply high debt on average, as corrinunities could build up assets in
anticipation of heavy expenditures, and pay off any debt quite quickly. Most
large expenditures, e.g., school buildings, are easily anticipated, making this
process straightforward. Also, for large comunities, any given lumpy capital
expenditure would not be so large relative to the total budget, making it easier
to pay for the expenditure over a short period of time. There seems to be
little reason to expect in the data a strong association between the level of
debt and the size of the community's capital stock.
2. Burden on current versus future residents.
Conventional wisdom also says that bond finance of capital projects and tax
finance of current expenditures is more equitable, because under this system
payments and benefits coincide in time.If trie housing stock is unchanging,
however, any difference in timinc of payments and benefits ought to be capital-
ized in house prices, thus leaving incentives on financial policy unaffected.
Wra:currentresidents avoid payinc no through use of oebt tney end uppayinc
tnrcor redu:ec p—cpe: va ucs.Tr.i s is tu as ion: as ouvers an sd lers arc
in:nesame tax bracket, and buyers correctly perceive the fiscal position of
tne community.
However, new buyers may well misperceive the financial position of the com-
munity. For exam:ie. buyers arc likely totakethe property tax rate into
account, but may presume the taxes finance constant real exoenditures, wnereas
ceb: service involves corstan: nominal expendtures (ionorn: refinancing).
Tns consideration leacs to a oreferen:c fa tax finance.Or the other hanc.-10-•
keepingthe current tax rate low through debt finance may lead buyers to
underestimate future tax bills.
If the housing stock is not fixed, then use of debt finance allows more
of the cost of current expenditures to be pushed onto property used for new
construction. When a house isbuilt,that property becomes a larger share of
theproperty tax base of the comunity, and so pays a larger share of the
property taxes. When taxes are used to finance current expenditures, each
property pays based on its current shareof the total property tax base. How-
..L__L ever,WElCHUCU L s ueu, tøLlI prupr L pays ue oiliuai oi Lue
property tax base over the next twenty years or so. If a new house is built on
a property during that time, then that property pays a larger share of the
original expenditures if debt finance is used rather than tax finance.
A corrinunity would not necessarily wart to increase the tax burden on newly
bui t houses, however. If this tax burden already exceeds the marginal cost of
public services to new residents,10 and if the amount of new construction is
sensitive to the property tax rate, then shifting taxes further onto new resi-
dents may not be desirable.
3.Heterooeneityof the community.
lntheprevious section, wemadethe obviously unrealistic assumption that
tne community wasentirelyhornoceneous, iodeiiino the political decision makina
a ne:eoereouscommunityiscomniicateo, nowever. Tnmedian voter mode is
oftenused,ant wewilappeal toit belointhe empirical worK,butits
characterizationof the deci si on—making process i s very nai ye. The more hetero—
Qeneousthe community, the lesswe wouldexpectour tax story, asapplied to the
mediarincome voter, to fit tnedata.Similay, wnen reative orices of houses
within tnecommunity are cnancinç, there is a tlear conflict of interestabout
nan:acTicv, 'tn untertar ctcorne.
4. Tansa:tions costs cf bond 'ssuas.—11—
When municipal bonds are marketed, buyers seek information about the riski-
ness of the bonds. For large communities, rating services and brokerage houses
will collect and provide such information. For smaller communities, however,
available information would be much less reliable. As a result, buyers would
not be able to differentiate between safe and risky issues, and thus price them
the same, encouraging risky issues and discouraging safe ones, the classic
"lemons" problem. Whether or not the market breaks down completely, we would
expect our theory to apply much less well to smaller communities.
5. Rental units.
Renters favor debt finance if there is rent control with a property tax
pass through. If a project is financed by a property tax increase, then a
tenant under rent control must pay the full cost immediately. However, f debt
finance is used, rental payments each year would go up only slightly.If the
tenant expects to move before the debt is fully repaid, then debt finance is
clearly preferable.
If market rents arc unconstrained, however, then the ecuilibri urnrentis
affectedbymunicipal financial policy only through the preferences of ]andlords
——thedemand curve for apartments is unaffected by how expenditures are
financed, but the supply curve would be affected. Landlords would normally be
in high tax brackets. so prefer that the community avoid debt and atternot to
bLiicu areserve oftaxaiesecurities. Rentcr-vote maynotperceivethese
incentives, however.
II. Characteristics ofthe data set.
inorder to investicate the importance ofthe variousfactors affectinç
munc1pal financial pcHcv, we have assernbea what we believe to be a unique Set
of data. Our data source or government financial pclicy was the Finance Summary
Statistics from the 197Censusof Governments. This tane provided information
for all state and local government units on their revenues andexpenditures,—12-
plus the book value of various categories of financial assets and liabilities
that they held. Our data source on the characteristics of the residents of each
community was the 1980 Census of Population and Housing,11 Surrrnary Tape File 3C.
This tape reported a variety of characteristics of the population and the
housing stock for all "minor civil divisions" (MCD's) with at least 10,000 popu-
lation in eleven states, and all counties and RplacesI with at least 10,000
population.
Unfortunately, the two data sets were not easily matched. To begin with,
the identification codes for each observation on the two tapes had no relation.
Fortunately, the Census kindly created for us a third tape which matched these
identification codes wherever possible.In addition, however, many "places" are
not contiguous with any unit of government, while many units of government
(e.g., school districts) do not coincide with a "place" or an MCD, the unit of;
obs.rvation on the Census of Population and Housing tape. By necessity, our
study had to be confined either to MCD1s and those places which coincided with
units of government, or to counties. Our judoment was that the population of
each county would be very heterogeneous, and the variation in average charac-
teristics across counties would be too small to allow much to be learned from
county data. Our study therefore focusses on data for MOD's and places.
Inmanystates, however, school districts and special districts are very
-nortan:, an: triese districts can ssue oeb: 'n tneir own rioht. Residents
should no: :are whether debt is issued by their municipality or by their special
district —-theyare liable either way —-SOhow much debt is issued by MOD's
versus seciai districts should be arbitrary. But matched data is available
only or MOD's.
in oroer to avoid the problem of arbitrary division of financial respon-
cio Iitv.wefocussed on fou states where OI\ Smil fractior ofthe short-
term dab: and u-faith—arc—cedit lonc terncab:was issued by units of—13—
government other than MCDs —Connecticut(5%), Maine (32%), Massachusetts
(20%), and Rhode Island (1%).12 Within these states there were 276 usable
observations 13
For each community, we constructed a measure of itsoutstanding debt. This
figure was defined to equal the book value at the end of the year of short—term
debt plus long—term general obligation debt, minusany holdings of state and
local bonds. We made no attempt to estimate the market value of theoutstanding
debt, given the reported book values. Our presumption was that since all data
came from the same calendar year, the ratio of market value to book value should
be very similar for all corrnunities.'4
We did not include in our measure of debt the amount of revenue bondsor
other nonguaranteed bonds that each community had outstandtng. Such bondsare
not legal liabilities of the municipal government, and are not paid for out of
property tax revenues.
Wenextconstructed a measure for each corrrnunity of the book value at the
en of the year of its holdinos of Federal securities and other bonds,notes,
mortgages, and financial assets, excluding state and local government securi-
ties.A critical issue in constructino this measure was theproper treatment of
cash and deposits held in Hsinkinc funds, bond funds, or other nor-insurance
furos.' Such deposts could be held primarily for liquiditypurposes soon after
o:r:s are isscd orsoor bsfoe bonas are retirec.If :nev earrlesstnar tne
interestQUEOr:the bonds, as woulc checkinc accounts and perhaps savinas
accounts,tnen there is no arbitraoe reason to borrow to put the proceeds in
casn and deposits, However, Oeposits mightalso be held in moneymarket funds
or certificates of deposit, and earn a returnwell abDvethat or municipal
oonds. in oroer to compare the tyicai rate of return earned on casn and
ceotsits with that earrec or. otner taxable secur ties, we reoressed total
ir:eres income divaec by the pa value ofallsecurity holdings (/S: ac.ansta constant and the fraction of total security holdings held in cash and deposits
(CD/S). The results were as follows (standard errors are in parentheses):
(uS) =.045 + .015 (CDIS).
(.011)(.013)
The estimated rate of return on cash and deposits is 6% per year, almost exactly
the interest rate of 5.94% earned in one year Treasury notes of 1977, and higher
than the estimated 4.5% earned on other taxable securities.15 In most of the
results reported below, we therefore included cash and deposits in our measure
of taxable security holdings.
We also ignored any assets held in the various insurance and pension funds.
It is possible that comunities choose to borrow to overfurd their insurance and
pension funds, contributing more now and less later and earning a market return
tax free in the interim,16 Unfortunately, we had no information about the
extent of overfundirig in our data set, so did not pursue this.17
From the Census of Population and Housing we attempted to construct a
measure of the median marginal personal income tax rate of residents in each
community. The tape reports the medianfamilyincome ineachcorrrnunity. We
thenassigned to each family income the average marginal personal income tax
rateooservedfor toac income level intheN..E.P. TAXSIN file for 198C.ia
e dic no: flave any data or average wel:h oraveraeproperty valuesof
residentsin each communfty, as an indicator ofthetax capacity ofthecom-
munity.Asa proxy,weusedthe total income ofallresiaents in the coninunity.
W also had no information or tne per:ertaoc oftheresidents ina cam-
mur,cv wro itemize:. By the theory. oormrnitieswhae the mcdi anvoter itemizes
ocarcc sse j/(_, timesasmrjc ce: as cormrjres nere the mec ar
vo:e didno:itemize.in most of One resLl:s reportec or below, we made no
accemot cc control for d4fferenoes across :omuni:iesOne probaiiitvtna:—15—
the median voter itemizes. As we present the results, we will discusswhat
biases are likely to be present, given this omission.
Tables 1—4 present various summary characteristics of the financialpolicy
of communities in our sample. In each table, we have dividedour communities
into six marginal tax rate categories, with theaverage marginal tax rates of
the categories ranging from 23.4% to 35.0%. Table 1reports the average of the
ratios within each category of the book value ofoutstanding municipal bonds
divided by the total income of the corrniunity.It reports these figures for the
entire sample, for large communities (population over 25,000). for smallcom-
munities (population under 25,000), for relatively homogeneouscommunities, and
for relatively heterogeneous communities.19 Basedon the tax arbitrage argu-
ments of the previous section, we would expect the ratios to declinewith the
marginal tax rate and to cecline more dramatically for arge communities. Both
of these expectations are borne out unambiguously in the data.Higher tax rate
communities do still borrow, but much less so relative to theiraggregate income
than do lower tax rate communities. In small communities, there isno clear
pattern to the figures. The theory has no clear predictions about the differen-
ces between homogenous and heterogeneous communities. Here we find that the
ratios tend to decline in both cases.
The observed degree to which debt/income is lower in richcommunities
srio: underestimate the resoonsiveness of de: poicy to taincentives, since
the median voter wouic be likely to itemize only in the richercommunities. in
such richer communities, we should observe 1/(1-t) timesas much debt as they
would choose to accept if they did not itemize. Hadwe been able to control for
the effects of itemization, tne pattern observed in Table 1 shouldhave been
muon stronger.
Table 2 reports similar ficures for several otnermeasures of the financial
position of these communities. Tne first ano second linesreport the averageratio of debt to municipal tax revenues for the total sample and for large com-
munities. The theory suggested nothing directly about these ratios, though they
do show a similar but weaker pattern than the figures in Table 1. The next four
lines describe the average ratio of federal and other securities held, excluding
or including cash and deposits, divided by total income of the community. If
communities all prefer to borrow through the municipality rather than invest in
a tax free way, then these figures should all be a uniform fraction of the cor-
responding figures on the first two lines of Table 1. The average of the actual
fractions, calculated using the cash inclusive definition of Federal securities,
is reported on lines 7 and 8 for all and for large communities. For large com-
munities, we do find that security holdings increase with marginal tax rate, as
the theory forecasts.
Table 3 is designed to provide information about the size of the tax
sangs achieved through tax arbitrage within each marginal tax rate category.
The simplest form of arbitrage is to borrow at the municipal rate and invest at
the taxable rate, gaining rtm per year per dollar borrowed. The first line
reports the average of min(D,S)/Y as a measure of how much of this arbitrage is
occurring, where D represents debt, S represents security holdings, inclusive of
cash and deposits, and Y represents total income of the community. The second
forrrof arbitraceis to borrow and use the Droceeds tolowertaxes, saving resi-
cents maxtr—t0)rper year.20 jr tnesecond lineftne tablewe reportthe
averaoc value of max(D-S,0)/Y, as a measure ofthe extentofthis second
arbitrage. Finally, communities might also raise property taxes and invest in
secu'itiestaxfree, SavinQrtper collarinvested.Thethirdline ofthetable
reports the average ratioofmax(S—D,0)/i as ameasureofthisthird form of
arbitrage. By the theory, we would expect wealthier communities to favor this
trrcformoarbitraae.
:rorderto acoroximate theaveaoc ta> savin:from municipal firanciaT—17—
arbitrage within each marginal tax rate category, we require data on r and tm.
For r, we used .076, the average nominal rate on twenty year government bonds in
1977.21 There was no compelling reason for choosing this rate rather than many
alternatives, and all figures would simply change proportionately if another
rate were chosen. Choosing a value for tm is more important. If we simply com-
pare the interest rates on municipal and taxable bonds in 1977, we find an
implicit tax rate of 32% comparing 20 year prime municipals with 20 year new
issue Aa industrials, and 51% comparing one year prime municipals with one year
governments But none of these comparisons control for risk, call provisions,
etc. Gordon—Malkiel (1981) report a comparison of interest rates on taxable
bonds and tax exempt industrial revenue bonds issued simultaneously in 1978 by
the same firm with similar prQvisions.In this sample, tm is estimated to be
only 22.5%. Given this dispersion of estjmates, we calculated the tax savins
for each marginal tax rate category for both tm=.225 and tm=.36. These
estimates equal:
r/Y[max(tm—t,0)•max(D-S,0)+tm•min(D,S)+t•max(S—D,0)j
The resulting figures fo' tm=.225 are reported or the fourth line and for
tm.35 or the fiftn line. Tax benefits are larger for poorer communities, par-
wner t=.3E --poorcommunities gain more from borroinc and oo more
of it tnan c rich communities, whereas non communities do little to take
advantage of the ooportunity to invest tax free through their community. The
reported ficures represent the tax savinos before takinc account of itemization.
Those communities where residents itemize, predominantly the ricner communities,
save only (i—t) times the reported fioures given that the payments would have
beer tax deductible, so trat tha reported ioues unoerstate the oeoree of which
00crcommunitiesgain'-eia:ivetc richcommunities.or ai communities,-18-
however, the tax savings are extremely small.
One question raised by the figures in the tables is whether communities do
in practice borrow and establish substantial holdings of taxable securities, in
spite of IRS rules attempting to limit it. In order to examine this, we calcu-
lated the distribution of SID, and report this distribution in Table 4, defining
S to be either exclusive or inclusive of cash and deposits. Here we find that
with the exclusive definition of 5, over ten percent of the communities hold
taxable securities amounting to more than twenty per cent of the book value of
their debt, and six communities have invested more in taxable securities than
they have borrowed. This evidence is not necessarily inconsistent with strict
IRS enforcement of section 103(c) --theseoutlier communities could recently
have had large issues f bonds, the proceeds from which had not yet been spent.
However, using the cash inclusive definition of securities, most communities
ha far more securities than the IRS rules would seem to allow. This phenome-
non is not restricted to the four states we focus on. In all municipalities in
the U.S., municipal security holdings were 37.5% o municipal debt.
III. Analysis of the data.
In the previous section, we compared the financial policies of communities
withresidentshavino different marginal income tax rates. In doing so,
no'ever, we mace no attempt to control for other fa:tors which also rniahtaffect
fflflo.1policy.in this section, we construct measures of a few other factors
which ought to influence financial policy, anc tnen regress various measures of
munic-pai financial policy against these factors as well as the marginal tax
rateofthe residents c the community.tosee to. what decree the association
cunc above betweer a commuritys marciral ta rate anc its financial policy
mioho. e caused by other factors.
rthediscuss'or. of tax in:ertTvesrsection we aroued that if indivi—
CUOlStemize,if they temize irsome veers but notin others, if they face-19-
different tax rates among the years in which they itemize, or if they intend to
sell their house in the near future and the likely buyer faces a different tax
rate or itemizes while the seller does not, then strong tax incentives exist to
change municipal financial policy. No information is available which directly
measures the frequency of occurrence of any of these circumstances. Instead, we
picked a variety of indicators from the Census of Population and Housing.
The most direct indicator of the likelihood that the median voter of the
community itemizes is the median income of residents. From the N.B.E.R. TAXSIM
file, we know the per cent of taxpayers who itemize (P1) at each income level.
If communities segregate by itemization status as well as by income, then in
this per cent of the communities of a given income level the median resident
will itemize.IF the median resident does itemize, then the corrrnunity ought to
be observed with 1/(1-t) times as much debt, everything else equal, or equiva-
lently be observed with the fraction t/(i-t) more debt. Therefore, if corn-
munities do segregate by itemization status, then, everything else equal, the
expected debt/income ratio for a community would be changed by the factor
(1 +tPI/(1-t))due to the effects of itemization.
The simplest indicator of changinc itemization status over time is just the
age distribution of the residents. Younger residents are more likely to ite-
rnize. Since they are less likely to be itemizing when they are older, they
woulc wish to pay as much as they car ir, taxes while tney are young when
proerpty tax payments are tax deductible. Older residents are less liKely to
itemize and more likely to expect to sell shortly. As a result, they may either
want to borrow now, since a buyer will likely itemize to be able to deduct the
payment, or avoid borrowing now, since the buyer might misperceive a high pro-
perty tax as representinc a fixed real rather than a fixed nominal burden. The
particuia summary measures of the age distribution that we chose were: 1) the
per cent of the adult (over aoe 25) popLiation that was younger than aoe 45 (-20-
young), and 2) the per cent of the adult population over age 60 (% old).
The Census also contained several direct indicators of the past mobility of
residents currently living in the town. High mobility among owners indicates
that residents are more likely to be itemizing, having recently acquired a
mortgage so prefer to pay for expenditures now while the tax payments are tax
deductible. It also indicates that an existing resident will more likely sell
his house in the near future, and prefer more debt if the buyer is itemizing and
in a higher tax bracket. The particular indiators that we used were: 1) the per
ent of housing units in which the current occupant moved in within the last five
years (1-U10VE), and 2) the per cent of residents who lived in a different county
five years earlier (CMOVE).
In the first section, we also argued that renters would prefer debt finance
if they are covered-by rent control, but perhaps ought to prefer tax finance
otrwise. The Census did report the per cent of housing units which were
rented (% rent). Unfortunately we knew nothing about whether rent control
existed in any given community.
If new housing units are being built in town, part of the burden of current
expenditures can be pushed onto new housing units with debt finance, but not
with tax finance. The particular measure of cormiunity growth we used was the
per cent of existing housing units built within the last five years (NNEW).
Since state reaulations car; potentially limit (or at least influence) how
much debt municipalities within the state do issue, we included separate
constant terms ir the regression for each state. Based on the severity of the
state reguatons reported in footnote 5, we wuid expect municipalIties In
Connecticut to have the most debt, and those in Rriode island to have the least.
However, the direction of causation may not be clear —-thesize of the stat&s
iirts may wail just reflect common practice am:or: the states municipalities.
Finally, in some rearessions reportec oclo, we also induced as a—21—
regressor the ratio of municipal expenditures to aggregate income (ElY). Based
on the arguments in the first section, there would be no reason to expect any
causal relation between debt and expenditures. However, if the tax-exempt
status of interest on municipal bonds is serving as a subsidy to municipal
expenditures, then it must be true that communities which spend more are able as
a result to borrow more. Finding an association between debt and expenditures
in the data, after controlling for other factors, would at least suggest that
spending more allows a community to borrow more, implying that the ability to
issue tax—exempt bonds provides some subsidy to municipal expenditures. (Since
it is commonly argued that this tax—exemption specifically subsidizes capital
expenditures, it would have been preferable to try as an additional variable the
value of the municipal capital stock divided by income. No data were available
on the municipl capital stock, however.)
Our basic measures of the financial position of a community were 1) total
debt outstanding divided by total income, (D/Y), and 2) debt net of security
holdings (measured inclusive of cash and deposits) divided by income (D—S)/Y).
We tried a variety of regression specifications, reported in Tables 5—7, in
order to test the robustness of the association we found previously between a
community's financial policy and the marginal income tax rate of its median
resident.in, the first, we simoly reoressed each of our two measures o a corn-
rnrT:'sinancaoc:c acanst te:stot 1n0caLors oescrec above
(igriarinc tne itemization factor), and the marQinai tax rate of the median resi-
dent of the community. Since the tax incentive to issue debt is proportional to
max(tm-t,O), however, we expected that the effects of the marginal tax rate
wauicbenonlinea-, with variation in t mattenina most wren t<t. We therefore
created two tax rate variables, tL= mir(:,.27)and tH =max(t-.27,O),thereby
aliowinc the marginal effect changes r ttodiffer dependinc on wrether tis
less than or greater than: 0.27.220nexpectation was that the effect of each-22-
taxrate variable on municipal debt holdings would be negative, but that tH
would be much less important.
These regression results are reported in Tables 5 and 6, using either
dependent variable, and estimated over either all corrrnunities or only large com-
munities. In Table 5, we omit (ElY),whilewe include it in Table 6.
In every case, the coefficients of the marginal tax rate variables have the
signs and patterns forecast from the theory —-forecastedgross and net debt
declines with marginal tax rate, and more quickly when the tax rate is low than
when it is high. The results show no clear difference in the degree to which
corrrnunities invest in securities. If all comunities invested in securities
just up to the allowed IRS limit, then the forecasted values of (D—S)/Y should
be proportional to those for D/Y, with a proportionality factor of about 0.80.
The coefficients on the tax rate variables in Table 5 do tend to be propor-
ticately smaller, thouch only by about 12, when (D—S)/Y is the dependent
variable. However, the tax coefficients in Table 6 tend to be larger when
(D—S)/Y is the dependent variable, suggesting some tendency for wealthier com-
munities to invest more in securities.
The estimated magnitude of the effects of the tax rate are substantial,
particularly in Table 5. For example, if we forecast using the estimated coef-
ficients how much more debt relative to income a lance community would have if
:s tax rate equals 0.25 ratnen tnan 0.234. :ne :erence in tax races between
the hignest and the lowest of the six groups exanined previously, we forecast a
difference in D/Y of 0.126usincthe coefficients in Table 5 and 0.069usinothe
coeficients in Table 6.in comparison, wnen we estimated this difference pre—
\nously in the second line c Table no: controlling for anythinc else, we
found a difference o' 0.076. Tnis imniies tna: our previous results did not
anse from a failure to contrc cr ocher ooscrva:e factors.
0omaninc tre results in Tasles 5and6, we nt that in:iudinc E/Y) makes-23-
a large difference.It does appear that coriinunities are able to borrow more if
they spend more,23 even though the theory in section I suggested no clear reason
why additional' spending should cause the community to incur additional debt.
(In fact, one might argue that additional spending would make the community a
less attractive risk to a lender, since the extra spending would be a competing
demand on the tax base.)
If this observed association between spending and debt is interpreted to be
causal, then we conclude that spending is made cheaper because of a community's
ability to issue taxexempt debt. How large a subsidy to spending is implied by
these estimates? The difficulty in answering this question is that in the data
we are comparing the stock of debt with an annual flow of expenditures. In
order to interpret the results, let us assume that half of new debt issues are
short term (one year), and half are long term (twenty years), and let us assume
that all debt is repaid when it matures.24 Assume also that d% of expenditures
each year are financed by debt, and assume expenditures have been growing in
nominal terms at g% each year. Between 1957 and 1977, nominal state and local
expenditures grew at 9.6% per year, so let us approximate g by .096. Then at
any point in time, the stock of debt outstanding would equal .5(dE +dE—gsds)
0
where E equals the current level of expenditures and s indexes years.Our
regression coefficients imply that large communities which spend a dollar more
nave as a result $0.SE more debt outstanding, so tnat the total curren: debt
arising from past expenditures should equal (0.68)E. Equating the two
expressions and solving for d, assuming =0.096,we find that d 0.1375;
that is, each extra dollar of spending allows a community to issue 0.1375
dollars of extra debt.
When a community issues a dollar of tax exempt debt for twenty years, the
cost of making payments or tne Cet, assuming tnat t<t, equals
rme_r(i_t)sds + e.20r(1t) .Ift0.234 (the value for the poorest of our-24-
six groups), if t =0.35,and if r =0.076,then this expression equals 0.90 —-
thetax—exempt status lowers the cost of the long term debt by 10%. Similarly,
when debt is issued for one year, given the same procedure and parameter values,
the debt is cheaper by 0.86% (approximately r(l-t)-rm) because of its tax—exempt
status. Given our assumption that half of the debt issued is short term and
half is long term, the average savings from issuing debt are 5.43% of the value
of the debt issued. Since, by our calculations, a dollar of extra expenditures
results in only 0.1375 dollars of extra debt, the cost of this dollar expen-
diture is reduced by only 0.05430.1375 =0.0075dollars as a result of the
tax—exempt status of the debt, a trivial 0.75% subsidy rate for this low-income
community. For wealthy communities, for whom t>tm, there would be no reduction
in the cost of extra expenditures. Our results therefore suggest that this tax
exemption should have virtually no effect on the cost of municipal expenditures.
Among the other coefficients reported in Tables 5 and 6, most tend to be
small and insignificant. In many cases, the forecasts from the theory were also
ambiguous. The coefficients do indicate the following: 1) Middle—aged com-
munities tend to have the most debt, while younger communities have slightly
less debt and older communities have much less debt. This pattern seems to be
more consistent with the life cycle pattern of spending on local public ser-
vices, some fraction of which is debt financed, than with the tax arbitrage
aroumen: :section .2Mobile coraTurTtes tend to avoid debt, as expected.
3 Connecticut communities tend to have siiahtiy more debt, as expected, though
there are rio clear differences among the other states.
The results reported in Tables 5 and 6 suffer from the problem that the
dependent variable is deflated by income, anc' in addition triree independent
variables, E/Y and the two tax rate variables, are constructed using income
information. If the renorted income fiaures cc not measure tne correct theore-
tical concect without error, as is inevitabe. trier the pre'ious coefficient—25-
estimates are somewhat biased.
We felt that the indirect correlation with the residual would be greatest
for (ElY), so we reran the previous regressions with instrumental variables,
using as instruments all the independent variables except for (ElY), plus
(E/population), CE/population)2, and the fraction of the population of school
age. The results were almost identical to those reported in Tables 5 and 6.
Any bias due to correlation of the tax variables with the residuals should
be slight ——thetax variables are constructed using median family income, and
the correlation of this with total income of the should be smalL. To
attempt to control for any bias, however, instrumental variables did not seem
worthwhile —-thereseemed to be no good instruments for marginal tax rates.
Instad, we tried deflating the dependent variable by tax revenues rather than
income. Tax revenues is probably less highly correlated than is income with
property values, the deflator argued for in section I, but the correlation
should still be high.ifl addition, with this specification we test whether corn-
rnunties simply rely proportionately or debt finance vs. tax finance when
funding expenditures.
The resultine coefficient estimates are reported in Table 725 We have
omitted (expenditures! revenues) from these rearessions, as its variation
reflects interoovernrnental transfers as well as interest payments on existino
se:, acto::r a e :rie' -e e\ar o enocoenosSirce me rnea a uc
ofthe oependent varable is approximately ten times as large as tnat o flY,
the coefficient estimates are also much larger. However, all previous patterns
1:tnecoefficients remain present, particularly for large communities. For
exam: 'ethe orecastec d ferencc ir tne aepenoer variable beteer conrnt1n ties
=0.234anc =0.3D0150.30,,rorecasng usin triecoeficients o
tric fu1sam:ie, arc 3.844, usin tnc samle c lance : comparison,tne
diferences reporLe in Table 2 fortrese tw: 'caseswere 0.23 an0.272,—26-
respectively. While the statistical fit is somewhat poorer when DIRisthe
dependent variable, the qualitative results reported previously continue to be
present —-ourprevious findings do note seem to arise from a simple statistical
bias.
Another bias caused by the multiple roles of income arises from the fact
that residents in higher income comunities are more likely to itemize, and com-
munities where residents itemize, by our theory, should have 1/(1-t) times as
much debt. Since primarily rich communities itemize, had we controlled for the
effects of itemization, the estimated effects of taxes should have been yet
stronger. To estimate how sensitive our results are to the effects of itemiza-
tion, we reran the previous regressions for large communities after multiplying
all right—hand side variables, including the constant, by the factor
(1 +tPI/(1-t)).As expected, the coefficients on the tax variables were
ia ;er, though not dramatically so. The other coefficient estimates were simi-
lar to those reported previously. Since our proxy for whether a corrinunity ite-
mizes is far from perfect, these results should be interpreted with caution.
IV. Conclusions
On theoretical grounds, we argued that poorer comunities face much
stronger incentives to issue municipal bonds than do wealthier comunities, and
our e:ricai work showed that poor comTuntes do in fact borrow a great dea
more.Ir. contrast, wealthier cornunties shoid face ar incentive toinvest
through their community and so avoid tax on income frocr savings, yet we foundin
the data only limited evidence of such a pattern. Apparently municipal
ernoiovees are not trusted as investment manaocrs.
Wna: then do we conclude about tn cstributional ano efficiency effects of
toese tax incentives faced bymurHciait'es?In section :, we calculated the
tax sa''inas to resicents resu itinc fron municipal financial policy, anc found
tnat toe 200rest communities gained toemostrelative to their income, thouo—27-
for all communities the tax savings, as a per cent of income, were extremely
small. Of course, the wealthy gain substantially as purchasers, rather than
issuers, of municipal bonds, and this gain to the wealthy, as purchasers of tax-
exempt bonds, should be the dominant distributional effect of the provision
making these bonds tax—exempt. Those in the middle of the income distribution
are left with little gain from either side of the market.
Communities undertake only a limited amount of such tax arbitrage because
there are some offsetting costs, due perhaps to costs of risk bearing and agency
and bankruptcy costs. These offsetting costs, which are real costs, are one
component of the efficiency cost of the tax—exempt status of municipal bonds.
At the margin, in equilibrium, these costs must be as large as any extra tax
savings. In aggregate, these costs must be smaller, though, else no arbitrage
would occur. How much smaller is not clear. For a detailed simulation study of
the efficiency and distributional effects of the tax exempt status of interest
on municipal bonds, see Gordon-Siemrod (1983).
One justification commonly given for the tax exempt status of interest
on municipal bonds is to subsidize municipal expenditures. Yet, according to
our estimates, any reduction in the cost of municipal expenditures arising from
the tax—exempt status of municipal bonds, is trivial. The justification for
tax-exempt bonds must be sought elsewhere.Gordon & Slemrod
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1. We implicitly assume that individuals can borrow and lend freely at a
before tax interest rate of r, pay tax on any extra interest earnings
(e.g., do not save at the margin in an IRA), and itemize if they borrow.
If individuals face a higher opportunity cost of funds, due for example to
binding borrowing constraints, then the discussion in the text would need
to be modified in a straightforward way.
2. See, for example, Poterba (1984).
3.if the individual itemizes, then the accounting of this cash flow is
oen:ca to that fararIRA. Giver itemization, a property tax increase
$(i//I—t)) costs te indivicua I net of income taxes. After a year,
the corrrnunity owns $(i+r)/(1-t) in assets, When it lowers property taxes
by this amount, the individual saves (l±r) net of income taxes, given the
deductibility of property tax payments. Since the dollar, if invested
cirectly, would have been wortr (i+r(1-t)), the net oemtoinvestinc a
dollar in the community equals (ir)-(1±r(i-t) rt.2
FOOTNOTES CONTINUED
4. These incentives have also been described in Adams (1977) and Gordon—
Slemrod (1983).If residents itemize, the story would be modified
slightly, as in footnote 3. The coninunity would borrow S(1/(].—t)), saving
residents 1, given the deductibility of property taxes, which they can
then invest at an interest rate r(1-t). When the municipal debt is repaid,
the individual must pay (i+rm)!(i—t) extra in property taxes, but at a cost
net of income taxes of (l+rm). Arbitrage profits are still r(l—t)—rm, but
now on municipal borrowing of (1/(1-t)).
5. For example, in the states we examine below the limits are asfollows.
In Maine, each municipality may issue debt up to 7.5% of assessed value,
school districts may borrow up to 12.5% of assessed value, and special
districts and other government entities face their own debt ceilings.In
Massachusetts, cities can borrow up to 2.5% of assessed value, towns up to
5, and fire, water, light, and improvement districts up to 5%; however the
first tw limits can be doubled with permission from the state. In
Rhode Island, municipalities can borrow up to 3% of assessed value, but
excluded fror this limit are housing authority, public building authority,
anc vaius ctner bards; tn state car authorize towns exceed tnese
limits. Connecticut, in contrast, restricts general ooiigation debt to
2.25 times the latest tax receipts, though makes certain types of debt
exempt from these limits. The limits car also be increased for certain
purposes, such as school building projects or urban renewal. For further
discussion, see Starner (1961), or A.C..R. (1974).3
FOOTNOTES CONTINUED
6. The problem was that the reported figures for long term debt issues in 1977
in our sample included a sizable amount of revenue bonds, used to finance
such activites as utilities, pollution control, hospitals, single family
housing, industrial aid, etc.In aggregate in 1977, Peterson (1978)
reports that total debt issues, including revenue bonds, equalled 118.7% of
local capital outlays, and the figures in our sample were not much
different. Revenue bonds, however, are with rare exceptions not legal
liabilities of the municipality, and are repaid out of mortgage payments,
rental income, or other user fees. The municipality, ;when issuing revenue
bonds, is merely acting as a conduit for funds for some other quasi —public
or private organization, and not providing any tax arbitrage for residents.
Unfortunately, we have no figures on issues of general obligation debt.
7.Foran overview of these various factors, see Gordon (1982).
E.As in the discussion of corporate financial policy, further debt issues
would raise the probability of default, leading to higher anticipated real
exoenditures by both lenders and the comunity when negotiating a
settlement.
RS rLes cc not aiow interest or cab: to be oecucte if tnc funds are
borrowed to buy tax exempt securities. However, Y an indiviauai borrows
for another purpose, interest is deductible even if municipal bonds are
simulaneouslv held. In most cases, an indivicual should be able to avoid4
FOOTNOTESCONTINUED
9 (continued), this IRS rule. If the IRS rule is binding, however, then the
risk adjusted value of rm would exceed r(1-t), and individuals in this
situation would prefer to avoid municipal borrowing.
10. This could occur if the community has imposed tight zoning restrictions on
new construction.
11. While the dates of the two censuses were three years apart, we felt that
this gap was small enough to ignore.
12. With more time, we might have expanded the sample further to include
New York (26%), New Hampshire (30%), and perhaps Wisconsin (40%).
13. Three towns were eliminated for which the reported figures were estimated
by the Census rather than reported by the town.
14. Measurement error should be less, however, for growing corrkmunities, where
debtwould havebeen issued more recently.
15. This figure is the return on book value rather than market value, so its
low value probably just reflects the fact that the bonds tend to be old.
16. For a description of these incentives, focussing on corporate plans, see
Black (1980) and Tepper (1981).
1. InmarandSeidmar (198),however,findthat local oovernment pensions
tendto be underfunoec
18. We would like to thank Daniel Feenberg for calculatinc these figures for
us.
19. A community was defined to be homogeneous if at least 24% of its families
had ar income witnin 20% of the median income.5
FOOTNOTES CONTINUED
20. Residents do presumably bear some offsetting costs, however, such as risk
and agency costs. Unless state restrictions on borrowing are binding,
in equilibrium the marginal increase in these costs as more debt is issued
would just equal the extra taxes saved. Average costs would be
substantially less than average tax savings, however.
21. The interest rate data used in this paragraph come from the Salomon
Brothers Center, An Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads.
22. The break point of 0.27 was chosen because it provided a reasonable
estimate of trn, and because it divided the sample approximately in half.
23. Other explanations for the statistical association are possible, however.
For example, comunities with large amounts of comercial and industrial
property can both spend more and find it attractive to borrow more ——
lenderswould have the commercial and industrial tax base as additional
col lateral.
24. The results are very insensitive to these assumptions about the maturity
structure of the debt.
2E. Asefa, Adams, and Starleaf (1981)reportsimiar regression results.
Specfica)iy,on asarnpft o 66Claractowns taKen from the 1972 and 1967
Censuses, they regressed (change in the book value of nominal debt between
1967 and 1972)/(estimated total expenditures) against median income,
capital expenditures as a fraction of tctal expenditures, % old, HMOVE,
percent growth rate in popu'ation, and a few other variables. They also6
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25 (continued), found a negative effect of median income, and in addition found
that a dollar of extra capital expenditure was associated with 50.314 of
extra debt issues. However, changes in debt, the focus of their work, need
have only a very weak connection with the equilibrium level of debt
holdings, the focus of our paper. Communities may mostly finance large
capital expenditures initially with debt in order to avoid large fluc-
tuations in their property tax rates, but may differ substantially in how
quickly they pay back the debt or the degree to which they build up
reserves in anticipation of upcoming expenditures. Their coefficient esti-
mates also ought to be unstable across time periods, since the dependent
variable, changes in nominal debt, is strongly affected by the inflation
rate and the age distribution of the debt.Gordon & Slemrod
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5. Heterogeneous towns 10.2 6.6 7.0 7.4 4.8 3.0TABLE 2
Alternative Measures of Financial Position
Definition/Sample Range of Marginal Income Tax Rates
.210- .245- .257- .275— .293- .325+
.245 .257 .275 .293 .325
Debt/Revenues
1. All 71.4 74.1 73.5 74.1 69.8 48.3
2. Large towns 64.3 80.7 69.6 76.0 51.0 37.1
Securi ties/Income
without deposits
3.All 0.54 0.46 0.87 0.45 0.28 0.35
4. Large towns 0.88 0.96 1.07 0.41 0.26 0.41
with deposits
5.All 2.8 2.5 2.8 1.9 2.3 2.0
6. Largetowns 3.0 3.4 2.9 2.0 2.1 1.7
Securities/Debt
with deposits
7.All 65.8 60.6 49.1 40.7 54.2 64.7
8.Large 32.4 43.9 42.6 46.2 79.2 87.5
Note: All figures arereportedas percentages rather than as fractions.TABLE 3
Extent of Various Forms of Tax Arbitrage
Fote: The definition ofsecuritiesincludes cash and deposits. All figures
are reported as per cents, rather than as fractions.
Definition Range of Marginal Income Tax
.210- .245- .257- .275-




1.rnin(D,S)/Y 2.7 2.3 2.3 1.8 2.2 1.7
2.rnax(D—S,0)/Y 5.2 5.1 4.6 4.9 4.1 2.3



















Taxable Securities Held as a Percent of Municipal Debt:
Distribution Across Communities
Percentile Range
Definition 0 0—.1 .1-.2 .2-.3 .3-.4 .4-.5 >.5
Securities/Debt
1. Without deposits 60.9 23.6 4.7 2.2 0.4 2.9 5.4




DIV (D-S)/Y DIV (D-S)IV
I ndependent
Variable All towns Large towns
1.Constant 0.43 0.42 0.84 0.87
(0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.25)
2. tL —0.93 —0.80 —2.32 —2.12
IAA\ IA (A A\ Hi
3.t —0.26 —0.23 —0.53 —0.45
(0.14) (0.15) (0.27) (0.36)
4. %young -0.04 -0.12 —0.07 —0.21
(0.13) (0.14) (0.23) (0.31)
5. %old -0.28 -0.35 —0.42 —0.56
(0.13) (0.14) (0.22) (0.29)
6. CMOVE —0.07 -0.07 -0.02 —0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.10)
7.F0VE —0.11 -0.05 —0.06 —0.03
(0.10) (0.11) (0.19) (0.25)
8. % rent 0.09 0.06 -0.02 —0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.11)
9.HNEW 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.05
(0.10) (0.10) (0.20) (0.25)
10. Conn. 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
11.Maine —0.02 -0.02 —0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
12. Mass. -0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
StandardError
othe ReQression 0.041 0.043 0.038 0.050
0.205 0.145 0.422 0.241




D/Y (D-S)/Y D/Y (D-S)/Y
Independent
Variable All towns Large towns
1. Constant 0.18 0.24 0.38 0.56
(0.12) (0.13) (0.19) (0.27)
2. tL -0.35 —0.39 -0.86 -1.16
(0.28) (0.32) (0.47) (0.69)
3. t -0.15 —0.15 —0.47 —0.41
(0.13) (0.15) (0.24) (0.35)
4. % young 0.02 —0.08 -0.05 -0.20
(0.12) (0.14) (0.20) (0.30)
5. % old —0.15 —0.25 -0.33 —0.50
(0.12) (0.14) (0.19) (0.28)
6.CMOVE -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.10)
7.F1DVE —0.17 —0.09 —0.17 —0.10
(0.09) (0.11) (0.17) (0.25)
8. % rent 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.07
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11)
9.HNEW 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.07
(0.09) (0.10) (0.17) (0.25)
10.Corin. 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01
(0.D9) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
r r r'( ( t(
12.Mass. -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
13. E/ 0.57 0.40 0.68 0.45
(0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.18)
Stancac Error
of tneRecressior 0.037 0.042 0.033 0.049




DIR (D-S)/R DIR (D-S)IR
All towns Large towns
1. Constant 2.6 2.9 4.5 5.9
(1.6) (1.5) (1.7) (2.5)
2. tL —1.2 -2.3 -8.1 -10.5
(3.8) (3.6) (3.9) (5.7)
2 _2 2 _2 —F Q- 2
(1.8) (1.7) (2.3) (3.4)
4. % young —1.4 —1.7 -1.0 -2.2
(1.7) (1.6) (2.0) (3.0)




6. CMOVE —0.4 -0.4 0.1 0.5
(0.5) (0.5) (0.7) (1.0)
7. HMOVE —0.9 —0.5 -0.6 —0.7
(1.3) (1.2) (1.6) (2.4)
8.% rent 1.0 0.7 —0.4 —0.4
(0.6) (0.5) (0.7) (1.1)
9. HNEW 1.7 1.3 0.4 -0.0
(1.2) (1.1) (1.7) (2.5)
10. Conn. 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1
(0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2)
1. —0.2 —0.1
(0.2) (0.2) (0.4)
12. Mass. —0.2 —0.2 0.1 0.0
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2)
5tandardError
ctr}eReQressor 0.512 0.78 0.324 0.482
C.15 C.i44 0.276 0.120